Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965)

1965

Douglas L. Robinson and Nelda H. Robinson v.
Paul Singleton Hreinson : Appellant's Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.L.E. Midgley; Attorney for Defendant-Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Robinson v. Hreinson, No. 10337 (1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4823

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

).

IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
.
STATE OF ~f; . ::·
'

.t

DOUGLAS L. ROBINSON a.ud
NELDA H. ROBINSON_,

. · .1 ·,
P~tiffs 09r4 BBHfJO~, ·~: :~'~

-vs.-

.,,

•,

L. E. MIDGLEY
. 5. -~
415 Boston Building
·· !. •>.~
·.·. ~~:,,
'
. , 'll!f'.f.;
Salt Lake City, Utah
· ",:!> ~- ·- · ~? · c ·.
.Attorney for Defe~.APfHlfMI···, i ~.,~ ·
Paul Singleton Hreinson

HEiBER GRANT IVINS
75 North Center
i·
American Fork, Utah
.Attorney for Plaintiffs-Bespottl,~
Douglas L. Robinson M&d,
·
Nelda H. Robinson

•

'

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------- ---------------------------------- 2
STATEMENT OF POINTS ARGUED
POINT ONE. THE PLAINTIFF'S INTERJECTION
OF "INSURANCE" BEFORE THE JURY, RESULTED IN
AN UNFAIR TRIAL TO THE DEFENDANT_ ------------------------

3

POINT TWO_ THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE SPECULATIVE TESTIMONY OF DR.
WAYNE M. HEBERTSON AS TO THE FUTURE MEDICAL TREATMENT THE PLAINTIFF MAY REQUIRE
AND INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT THEY COULD
CONSIDER THE NEED FOR FUTURE MEDICAL
TREATMENT IN MAKING AN AWARD. ---------------------------- 13
CASES CITED
Balle vs. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P. 2d 224-.______________________________

3

Carraco Oil Co. vs. Morhain (Okla.) 380 P. 2d 957 ____________________ 15
City of New Cordell vs. Lowe (Okla.) 389 P. 2d 103 ________________ 11
Condron vs. Harl (Hawaii) 374 P. 2d 613 ____________________________________ 15
Dolliver vs. Lathrom, 183 Okla. 329, 82 P. 2d 675____________________

9

Fairley vs. St. Loui,s Public Service Company, (Mo.) 362
s.w. 2d 5·49 ------------------------··---------------------------------------------------- 16
Gittens vs. Lundberg, 3 Utah 2d 392, 284 P. 2d 1115________________

4

Hill vs. Cloward, 14 Utah 2d 55, 377 P. 2d 186. _____________ ---------

7

Ivie vs. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5, 336 2d 78L______________________________

5

Madison vs. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. (La.) 120
So. 2d 342 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
Moore vs. D.&.R.G.W. R.R. Co., 4 Utah 2d 25·5, 292 Pac. 2d
849 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17
Pratt vs. Womack, (Okla.) 359 P. 2d 223____________________________________ 9
Redman vs. McDaniel, (Okla.) 333 P. 2d 500. ____________________________ 10
Reid vs. Owens, 98 Utah 50, 93 P. 2d 680____________________________________

5

Page

Rojas vs. Vuocolo, 142 Tex. 152, 177 S.W. 2d 962____________
Sailtas vs. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P. 2d 176________________________

11
4

Sang vs. City of St. Louis, 262 Mo. 454, 171 S.W. 347 ___________ 14
TEXTS CITED
4 A.L.R. 2d 816__________________________________________________________________________________

9

69 A.L.R. 2d 1261, 1263 ----------------------------------------------------------- ____ 14
McCormick, Damages, P. 324 -------------------------------------------------------- 14
McCormick, Evidence, P. 132 __________________________________________________________ 17
California Evidence, P. 135 ---------------------------------------------------------- 17
STATUTES CITED
41-12-5, Uta:h Code Annotated ------------------------------------------- __________

5

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DO-CGLAS L. ROBINSON and
NELDA H. ROBINSON,
Plni1diffs and Respondents,
-vs.-

Case No. 10337

PAT"L SINGLETON HREINSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

S'rATEMENri1 OF THE KIND OF CASE
'rhe Plaintiff hrought this action to recover damage~
for personal injuries to Plaintiff Nelda Robinson, and
pro1wrty damage and loss of consortium to Plaintiff
Douglas L. Robinson, arising out of an automobile accident occurring on Decemlwr 7, 19G3, on U.S. Highway 91,
Plt>asant Grove, Utah.
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DISPOSITION IN LUWER COUR'l'
The case was tried on the question of damages only,
inasmuch as the Ddendant admitted liability, and J udgment on the jury verdict was rendered in favor of the
Plaintiffs as follows:
Douglas L. Robinson
Automobile Damages --------------------------------$

258.00

General Damages for
loss of consortium --------------------------------

7-1-2.00

Total ------------------------------------------------------------$ 1,000.00
Nelda H. Ro bins on
Special Damages ----------------------------------------$ 1,217.4:-!
General Damages -------------------------------------- 10,000.00
Cost of household help ----------------------------

679.50

Total ------------------------------------------------------------$11,896.9-!
Def endant filed and argued a Motion for New Trial
which was denied and this Appeal was then taken.
STATEMEN'r OF FACTS
The facts of the accident are immaterial and are not,
therefore, reviewed.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant "leeks reversal of the Judgment, and a
new trial.
2

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE PLAINTIFF'S INTERJECTION OF "INSURANCE"
BEFORE THE JURY, RESULTED IN AN UNFAIR TRIAL
TO THE DEFENDANT.

The Plaintiff Nelda H. Robinson testified, on direct
examination by ht>r Attorm'y, <.'.Oncerning several persons
who had assisted her with household help for several
months following the accident and during the said testimony ( T-89, 90) she testified as follows :

"Q. Now, after .Mrs. Hoops left, did you hire
someone additonal?
"A. vVell, we really didn't hire my sisterin-law, but she had quit her job at the time and
was coming down about three times a week and
helping us out, and she is still doing this. This is
Joanne Robinson. And I told her that I would be
glad to pay her, and she said that if ·we got enough
and it would be - if the insurance would pay for
her ·wages, then she would accept payment. If not
she \Vouldn't, because she was my sister-in-law
and she wouldn't expect money."
A review of the "Gtah Supreme Court cases leaves
no doubt that whether or not the Defendant was insured
is i111111aforial and prejudicial.
In 1932 the case of Balle -vs- V. S. Smith, 81 Utah
179, 17 P 2d 22-±, the Court stated:
''Comts have guarded jealously against the
introduction of such evidence before the jury, not
only because it is irrelevant to the issue, but be3

cause jurors are commonly thought to be prejudiced against insurance companies, and if the fact
were known that the Defendant is insured, jurors
would be less inclined to consider the case on the
merits, and more inclined to render a verdict for
Plaintiff and in a larger amount than if the Defendant . . . . . had to bear the loss alone."
In Saltas -vs- Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P 2d 176, at
179 this Court, in discussing the problem stated:
" ... the Plaintiff's Counsel, knowing human
nature and sympathies, leaning to relief when no
direct imposition of punishment or hurt may be
the direct result, is keen to get before the jury
such information as will enhance the amount of
the verdict. A suggestion that insurance exists is
thought to furnish a motive or a temptation to
trespass. Neither this Court nor the Trial Court is
concerned about the question as to whether a Defendant carries insurance. Nor should the jury be
so concerned. The cases indicate that this question,
which should not be and is not a matter of concern,
is often interjected in indirect ways upon this
matter of insurance, giving rise to many cases."
1

In Gittcn -vs- Lundberg, 3 Utah 2d 392, 28± P 2d 1115
(1955) this Court again holding that the Defendant's insurance is immaterial, states :
"Generally speaking, reference to ( insuranc2)
for the purpose of getting it before the Jury is
prejudicial. An exception to this is where a reference to insurance is so inter1voven in an admission
against interest that it is impractical to exclude it
without destroying or impairing the benefit of
the admission, to which the Plaintiff is entitled."
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In Reid-'cs- Owells, 98 Utah 50, 93 P :2d 680 at 685 the
Court states:
" . ~We would be closing our eyes to a fact
1\·ell known to Trial Courts and Trial Lawyers
were we to assert that the probability of any jury
being influenced in determining the question of
liability and the question of the amount of recovery by the fact that the insurance company would
pay the damages assessed, is so remote as not to
challenge judicial notices."
In the more recent case (1959) of I vie -vs- Richardson, 9 Utah :2nd 3, 336 P :2nd 781, this Court, noting that
the jury's verdict was $5,000.00 stated:
"'11 his, it is commonly known, is the limit of
one type of insurance policy for personal injuries
to one's pernon."
lt will be noted in the case at bar, that the general
verdict of $10,000.00 for the Plaintiff is the same basic
re4uirement of the lJtah Financial Responsibility Act
(H-12-5 U.C.A., as amended), a fact commonly known
by residents of Utah, and therefore juries.
l\Irs. Robinson, while being questioned by her own
Attorney, and in response to a question which had nothing to do with insurance, voluntarily, and we think purposely, made it clear to the jury that her sister-in-law
intended to Le paid if the Plaintiff received a high enough
Judgment, or if the Defendant's insurance company
settl<•d the case and included that cost in the settlement.
Her answer left no doubt whatsoever but that that
was the clear and unmistakable arrangement she had with
her sister-in-law.
5

It will be noted that the Defendant, immediat<:'ly, indicated to the Court that it had a l\I otion, and outside the
presence of the jury, moved for a mistrial which was denied. Thereafter the trial proceeded with not even an admonition to the jury.

The Court indicated by his remarks that the Plaintiff had not indicated whPther she \Yas speaking of her
insurance or the Defe11da11t's insurance. (T90) Apparently, the Court saw nothing erroneous in allowing the jury
to conjecture in the jury room on whose insurance was
meant, as from the state of the Record, the Plaintiff's
statement was, as far as the jury was concerm•d, part
of the evidence which they had every right to consider.
If the Defendant actually had hopes that the above
conjecture might fool the jury into believing Plaintiff
meant her own insurance, he just wasn't thinking-as we
always assume juries do.

1. There is no insurance whatsoever that will
pay Plaintiff's sister-in-law to help aroimd the
hoiise-maybe Registered Nurses under a doctor's
order, but not household help. CWe invite Respondent to deny that that is true.)
2. Plaintiff's alleged conversation with her
sister-in-law took place about six months after the
accident, and following several others who allegedly helped. That would be ample time to find out
what her own insurance covered.
3. 8he was represented by eminently capable
counsel who could advise her in a few minutes
cursory reading of the policy that her policy (if
any) did or did not cover her for that expense.
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-±. Her prior testimony was that she had paid
prior help out of her own pocket-a peculiar
thing, if she had insurance coverage, or even a
possibility of coverage.
5. Her testimony was almost a year to the day
follm,·ing tlH-' accident. ~Was the jury to still gue:>s
that :>ht~ still hadn't found out her own insurance
coverage~

H is a sirnpl<' solution to close our eyes and assume
that the jury is composed of eight naive, uninformed and
somewhat hlasP individuals, or that the remark, perhaps
was not heard, maybe having been drmvned out by the
Christmas carols "·hich were heing played in the foyer of
the Court House during the Plaintiff's testimony.
'To consider the problem based upon the above, or
some other assumption, is to "close our eyes" to reality.
\Vhen the Plaintiff unexpectedly, and without forewarning to Defendant's Attorney, blurts out "insurance",
tlw Defendant in this and every law suit is placed in an
untenable position, for the following reasons:
1. An imrnNliatt• objection and a motion to strike,
made in the presencP of a jury, emphasizes the fact
that the De fondant is insured; else no objection or motion
would be made in the first place.

:L To allow the interjection of insurance to pass
without objection, in the vain hope that the jury was
aslee1i, would waive the Defendant's rights. (Hill -1JSClo1rnrd, 1-t Utah 2nd 55, 377 P 2nd 186.)
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3. After the motion for mistrial has been denied, the
Defendant's hands are completely tied, inasmuch as he
cannot cross-examine the Plaintiff on the question of
insurance in order to determine from her inunediately
which insurance she \Yas referring to, as by the very question he would be waiving his objection to the ans\ver,
(which Defendant already knows) and at the same time
the harm that had already been done would be aggravated, if that is possible.
4. The Defendant, certain that the interjection of
insurance has prejudiced the jury, is forbidden to place
in evidence such facts as the low limits of his policy; or
the fact, perhaps, that the insurance company is defending under a reservation of rights and may not, after all,
pay a judgment; or, if it be the case, that he really is not
insured at all.
5. The Defendant dare not ask the Court to admonish
the jury "Forget that the Plaintiff said 'insurance' ", or
words to that effect. This writer is of the unchangeable
belief that as soon as the Court pinpoints a remark to the
jury, he brings it into high focus, and his admonition to
the jury, to then forget it, make it that much more impossible for them to comply with the admonition. The Defendant, therefore, in order not to again aggravate, dwell
upon or enlarge the wound caused by the Plaintiff's
thrust, has only one recourse and that is to suffor in
silence.
Whether the Plaintiff's remarks concernmg insurance, in the presence of the jury, was purposeful or un8

intentional, should have no bearing on the obvious fact
that it was still highly prejudicial to the Defendant.
In ± ALR 2d 816 there is an Annotation in which
some Courts seem to feel that an inadvertent remark by
the Plaintiff, innocently made, seems to make some difference to the Defendant, even though it is an obvious
fact that the jury nevertheless, was prejudiced.
In the first place, it is impossible to conceive how
any Supreme Court can determine long after the trial,
whether the remark was "innocent" or designedly made
with malice aforethought, without pure, unadulterated
conjecture in the wildest form, and without ever having
even seen the Plaintiff in person.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in an excellently reasoned opinion, has faced the problem squarely.
In Pratt -vs- Womack 359 P 2d, (1961), wherein the
Plaintiff's husband, ·while testifying under direct examination by Plaintiff's Attorney, made the statement "I was
very sure that they carried compensation".
Defendant's Attorney immediately moved for a mistrial, which was denied, and the Trial Court admonished
the Jury not to give the remark any consideration.
Inasmuch as the language of the Oklahoma Supreme
Court squarely sets out the Appellant's position herein,
we quote at length from it, at Page 225:
"The Courts admonition does not cure the
prejudice." Dolliver -vs- Lathrom, 183 Okl. 329,
82 P. 2d 675.
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In Rrdman -i;s- McDaniel, Old., 333 P 2d 500,
we held that irn-' judicP results as a matter of law
when it is madt> to appear that Defendant is covered by liability insurance.
At Page 503 of the opinion, we said: In some
of our former decisions where Plaintiffs informed
the jury that Defrnclants were prntected by insuranee, vn' refused to reverse the Trial Court because we could not say that a new trial would result in a diffe1·ent finding, or result in a smaller
verdict. Stated another ·way, ·we refuse to reverse
because we were unable to say that the improper
conduct had any prejudical influence upon the
Jury.
These decisions are not realistic. They are in
conflict ·with the view that prejudice results when
the jury knows that an insurance company 'Nill
have to pay the .J udgrnent. It permits the Plaintiff
to deliberately inject heneficial prejudice into the
case, ·which experience permits a Plaintiff to retain that larger recovery for the simple reason
that it is difficult ,if not impossible, for this Court
to segregate and identify the harm done. This type
of decision encourages improper conductr ( emphasis added)

Since l\'e are of the view that knowledge of insurance coverage will cause a jury to render a
larger verdict and in some cases render a verdict
in favor of Plaintiff when otherwise it would not,
it becomes the duty of this Court to compensate
for the harm done hy appropriate action. In some
cases this may be done by directing a remittitur.
In other cases it may be necessary to grant a new
trial."
In the case at uar, the jury took to the jury room, as
evidence, the fact that the Defendant was insured. They
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had not even been admonished by the Court, or instructed,
that the evidence concerning insurance was i1mnaterial.
"Having been objected to and having been
rnl!:'d in, the ;jury were given to understand that
they WPre to use it for some purpose. The fact
that the incornpPtent testimony is laid before the
jury undPr favorable rulings by the Court . . .
tends to increase ratlH'l' than diminish its prejudicial effect." Bojas -vs- Viwcolo, 142 Tex. 152,
177 8.\V. 2d 9G2 cited in City of New Cordell -vsLou·c, Okl., 389 P. 2d 103 (1963).
If we are concerned with whether the Defendant had
a fair trial, and we are "realistic," as suggested by the
Oklahoma 8uprerne Court, and keep our "eyes open," as
suggested by this Court, then Plaintiff's voluntary interjection of Defendant's insurance before the jury, obviously prejudiced the jury, 'vith the only conclusion that
the trial was not fair.

How the Plaintiff prejudiced the jury, whether with
a secret design or an inadvertent remark which only
Plaintiff herself knows, seems imrnate1·ial.
\Ve believe that to condone an unfair trial to this
Defendant, on the grounds of a wild assumption that the
Plaintiff's remark was "innocent," will open the doors
very wide to future unscrupulous Plaintiffs. If these
future Plaintiffs are poor actors, practice will help, and
if they are semi-accomplished actors, the "inadvertent"
dropping of the word "insurance" will be a cinch. They
need only keep an innoeent, surprised expression going
while the Defendant's Attorney writhes and fumes, and
11

lets out strange noises. rl'he actor should not
say "Defendant's insuranee" - and he need not. Any
immediate action by Defendant's Counsel will take all
doubt out of the jury's mind. And if the Defondant's
Attorney just sits ther,•, sallow-complexioned and :-;tunned, then the act has \rnrh•d wonderfull>', and the certain
larger verdict gatlwrs 8% interest, while untenable objections are made to the Supreme Court, because Defendant's Attorney has waived his objections by silence.
l:HHiletlill~S

On whose shoulders should the risk of such an
proper remark lief Certainly not the Defondant.

im-

Furthermore, it is not an answer to this appeal that
the Judgment rendered was reasonable in light with subjective complaints claimed by the Plaintiff, and the testimony of her doctor.
The real unfairn('8S of the trial is found in the probability that tlw ;jury, knowing that the Defendant was insured, and as8llming that the verdict for the Plaintiff
would not "hurt" the insurance company, were thereby
led away from giving proper and adequate consideration
to the medical testimony produced by the Defendant,
which showed that there was nothing wrong with the
Plaintiff. It wa8 tlw contention of the Defendant, and
amply supported by evidence, that the Plaintiff was onl;-·
injured to a minor extent. Had "in8llrnnce" not been interjected and the jury unprejudiced, the jury wrdict,
despite the admission of liahilit;--, reasonably could have
been expected to be nominal in comparison with the verdict rendered.
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For these n•asorn.;, Defendant is entitled to a reversal, and a fair trial.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE
SPECULATIVE TESTIMONY OF DR. WAYNE M. HEBERTSON AS TO THE FUTURE MEDICAL TREATMENT THE
PLAINTIFF MAY REQUIRE AND INSTRUCTING THE
JURY THAT THEY COULD CONSIDER THE NEED FOR
FUTURE MEDICAL TREATMENT IN MAKING AN AWARD.

At the trial, the Plaintiff called Dr. \Vayne M. Heberb;on, a neurologist ( T-5±). Dr. Hebertson testified
that he examined Mrs. Robinson and gave her several
neurological tests ( T-55, 5G). As a result of his examination, he diagnosed Plaintiff as having suffered severe
strain of the neck and spine and radiculitis of the nerve
roots of the neck ( T-57). He also originally felt that the
Plaintiff may have sustained a herniated disc in the neck
area (T-57). The x-ray examination of the Plaintiff did
not show any abnormal condition of the vertebrae of the
Plaintiff's spine (T-61). Dr. Hebertson stated that the
Plaintiff's complaints were all subjective (T-73), and
his diagnosis was dependent upon the symptoms and
history supplied by the Plaintiff (T-69-72).
Over the Appellant's objection, Plaintiff's Counsel
was allowed to elicit from Dr. Herbertson his opinion as
to tlw need for future surgical treatment. Dr. Herbertson
stated that the Plaintiff could probably get along in her
pres(mt condition without surgical treatment but for her
condition to improve, she may need surgery (T-63). Dr.
Heberh;on indicated that if surgery was to be done in
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the future, it would probably involve a two step operation
with a spinal fm;ion being done in the lumbar region and
a cervical disc extraction and interbody fusion in the
neck area (T-6-1, G5). Dr. H<>bertson indicated that whether an operation would be necessary 1rnuld depend upon
whether the Plaintiff improved within the next six month
period (T-70) and frlt that an observation period of between twelve and eighteen months would be necessary
before he would definitely recommend surgery ( rr-70).
If the Plaintiff's condition improved, there 1rnuld be no
necessity for surgery (T-71). Dr. Hebertson had performed a myelogram on the Plaintiff which was negative
(T-71).

It is submitted that the testimony of Dr. Hebertson
as to the need of the Plaintiff to undergo surgery 1rns
speculative and anticipatory and not proper for the jury
to consider. That testimony when considered with the
fact that the trial court instructed the jury that they could
consider the nt'ed for future medical attention in making
their award constituted error.

It is well established that before a Plaintiff may
recover for future medical expenses or future medical
treatment, the likelihood of the treatment must appear
with reasonable certainty. Sm1g -vs- City of St. Loitis,
262 Mo. 45-1, 171 f:'-\\T. 3-17 (191-1); McCormick, Damages,
p. 32-1. The jury will not be allo1Yed to speculate as to
the possibility of future treatment. In 69 A.L.R 2d 1261,
1263, it is stated:
''Bpfore an allowanct• for the cost of future
medieal ean• ean lw made, there must, of course,
14

be evidence sufficient to support a finding that
any such care will be necessitated by the injury
forming the basis of the action."
ln Carracu Oil Cu. -V::;- Morhain, 380 P. 2d 957 (Okla.
1963), the Oklahoma Court reversed an award for the
Plaintiff in an automobile accident on the grounds that
the Court erred in giving an instruction allowing the jury
to consder the likelihood of a future operation. The
physician who testified said he could not be certain as to
the prognosis since he did not know how long the injured
Plaintiff would continue to use his limb and what recovery could be expected. r:L'he Court held the instruction,
although properly framed, was erroneous because of the
speculative nature of the evidence. It observed:
"There is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff will probably have further surgery. The
testimony on this point is unsatisfactory and inconclusive, rendering speculative ·whether such an
operation will probably be necessary to the preservation of Plaintiff's life or health. In the absence of any testimony that Plaintiff at some time
in the future will probably have to undergo an
operation on his hip, there is no legal basis for
assessing against Defendants the cost of such an
operation which may not occur.''
ln Condron -i;::;- Harl, 37± P. 2d 613 (Haw. 1962), the
Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed on the grounds that
the Court erred in submitting the issue of a future operation to the jury where it appeared the Plaintiff was
attempting to get along without surgery. r:l'he Court observed:
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''The testimony was to the effect that Plaintiff, on medical advice, ·was seeking to live \\'ith
his disability, rather than to be operated upon.
Surgery, it ·was testified, was an alternative to
be considered 'at such time as he felt that living
with it was too burdensome.' There was insufficient evidence to show ·with reasonable certainty
that Plaintiff's condition would, in future, call
for an operation. Accordingly it was error to
submit to the jury the matter of an avvard for the
expenses incident thereto (citing cases)."
To the same effect are Fairley -vs- St. Louis Public
Service Conipany, 362 S.vV. 2d 5±9 (Mo. 1962) and Madison -vs- Southern Farm Bureait Casualty Ins. Co., 120
So. 2d 3±2 (La. App.).
Applying the facts of the instant case to the rnles
and situations of the above cases, it is ap1mrent that the
trial court committed reversible error. Dr. Hebertson's
testimony was to the effect that Plaintiff's x-rays did
not show any abnormal condition and that the Plaintiff's
complaints \\'ere generally subjective. Dr. Hebertson's
diagnosis was principally based upon the history and
the subjective evidence offered by the Plaintiff. Dr.
Hebertson indicated the Plaintiff could probably get by
in her present condition, but that if she desired improvement, surgery may be necessary, however he could not
determine whether or not surgery would in fact be warranted for a period of twelve to eighteen months. Under
these circumstances, it is apparent that Dr. Hebertson's
testimony was speculative as to the need of the Plaintiff for future surgery, and although speculative or remote, evidence is a matter prineipally for the trial court's
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consideration; Witkin, California Evidence, p. 135; McConnick, Evidence, p. 132. By allowing the jury to receive such speculative evidence and then give an instruction that future medical t>xpense and treatment could be
considered in making an award, the jury was allowed
to return a s1Jeculative verdict which was reversible error. The facts and evidence in the instant case are similar
to those in the Co11dron (supra) case where the Hawaiian
Supreme Court nott>d that whether or not an operation
would take place l\'ould be dependent upon whether the
Plaintiff at some futme time felt corrective surgery was
necessary. A similar situation in the 111 orhain (supra)
case, manifests that the evidence in the instant case and
the accompanying instruction should not have been considered by the jury. In Moore -vs- D&RGWRR Co., 4
Utah 2d 255, 292 Pac. 2d 849 (1956), this Court recognized that in determining whether or not a Plaintiff was
entitled to recover for an injury, the context of a medical testimony must be considered as a whole, and if it
appears that the plaintiff's damages are mere possibilities or speculative, the Plaintiff is not entitled to have
the jury consider the issue. It is submitted that because
the operation which the jury was allowed to consider in
the instant case was tentative, speculative and uncertain,
this Court should reverse.
Respectfully submitted,
L. E. MIDGLEY
Attorney for DefendantAppellant
415 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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